10th Annual SF ISACA Fall Conference

October 4 – 6, 2010



# T32: Visa's Strategy to Secure Payment System

Tia Ilori, Visa




# Agenda

- Security Landscape
- Mission and Strategy
- **o** Payment System Security Compliance
- **o Cyber Security and Investigation**

o Q & A

#### 



### **Security Environment**

As PCI DSS compliance rates rise, new compromise trends emerge


- Compliance Milestone
  - PCI DSS compliance is adopted by acquiring participants in the U.S.
  - Merchants and service providers reduce historical storage of cardholder data
  - PCI DSS compliance improves among large merchants
  - E-commerce and payment channel websites better secured


• Compromise Trend




- Issuers and processors increasingly targeted; non-U.S. compromises increasing rapidly
- Data criminals seek capture of cardholder data in transit through sniffer attacks
- Compromises of small and medium size merchants increase
- SQL injection attacks on nonpayment sites to gain access to payment environment

#### **Criminals are Sophisticated & Organized** Estimated market value of compromised accounts\* **Recon / Hacker** Classic Gold/Plat/Corp Account number and CVV2 track data track data VISA PLATINUM VISA GOLD VISA VISA Data Cleanser / Aggregator No Plastic No Plastic No Plastic \$1 \$15 \$30 ┛ 1 Semi-finished Complete counterfeit Track data blank plastic Gold plastic and PIN Seller Cracker ISA CHECK CARD SA CHECK CAR 5518 5010 VISA ┛ VISA White-Plastic Finished Finished \$80 - \$100 \$250 \$1,000\*\* **Customer / Reseller** \*Source: The United States Secret Service, 2007 \*\*Typically track data and PIN not for sale; profit share arrangement amongst criminals; estimated criminal profit per card 1 1 ISAC











### **Common Compromise Vulnerabilities**

#### PCI DSS compliance should mitigate common vulnerabilities found to contribute to data breaches

PCI Data Standard	Common Compromise Vulneratilities	
Build and Maintain a Secure Network	<ul> <li>Failure to secure and monitor connected non-payment environment</li> <li>Improperly segmented networks</li> <li>Insufficient egress and ingress filtering and firewall monitoring</li> <li>Insecure database configuration</li> <li>Failure to update or change default passwords</li> </ul>	PREVENTION
Protect Cardholder Data		ž
Maintain a Vulnerability Management Program	Unprotected systems vulnerable to SQL injection attacks     Corporate websites targeted to gain access to network     Malware installed to capture passwords and cardholder data	ļ
Implement Strong Access Control Measures	<ul> <li>Failure to limit user access to critical system</li> </ul>	DETE
Regularly Monitor and Test Networks	<ul> <li>No monitoring of privileged user access</li> <li>No implementation or monitoring of intrusion detection or anti-virus</li> </ul>	DETECTION
Maintain an Information Security Policy		
010 0 FOCU 010 010201	S 10101010101010101010101010 0 1 10101010	SACA





#### U.S. Merchant Compliance Validation Requirements


Level	Validation Action	Validated By	Validation Deadline
1	Annual On-site Security Audit	<ul> <li>Qualified Security Assessor or Internal Audit if signed by Officer of the company And the security and the security of the securi</li></ul>	<ul> <li>September 30, 2007</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Quarterly Network Scan</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Approved Scan Vendor</li> </ul>	
2	<ul> <li>Annual Self-Assessment Questionnaire</li> </ul>	• Merchant	<ul> <li>December 31, 2007</li> </ul>
2	<ul> <li>Quarterly Network Scan</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Approved Scan Vendor</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>June 30, 2005</li> </ul>
and			
3			
3			
	Annual Self-Assessment	<ul> <li>Merchant</li> </ul>	• Determined by
4	<ul> <li>Questionnaire Recommended</li> <li>Network Scan Recommended</li> </ul>	• Approved Scan Vendor	merchant's acquirer

\* Merchants generally have 12-months to validate full compliance from the date of identification at the new level by the merchant's acquirer





### Franchise Payment System Security Best Practices: Key Security Concerns




## **U.S. PCI DSS Validation Status**

#### • Visa has been effective in driving PCI DSS among U.S. stakeholders

CISP Category (Visa transactions/year)	Estimated Population Size	Estimated % of Visa Transactions	PCI DSS Compliance	Confirmed Not Storing Prohibited Data
Level 1 Merchant (> 6M)	362	50%	93%	100%
Level 2 Merchant** (1 - 6M)	702**	13%	88%	99%
Level 3 Merchant (e-commerce only 20,000 – 1M)	2,627	< 5%	57%	N/A
Level 4 Merchant (< 1M)	~ 6,000,000	32%	Low	Acquirer Plans
VisaNet Processor (Direct Connection)	78	100%	97%	High
Agents (Downstream)	726	N/A	79%	Moderate

\* As of March 31, 2009; \*\* Legacy population; excludes Level 2 merchants identified in 2007 due 12/31/2008

# 



#### **Payment Application Security** Drive the adoption of secure payment applications Encrypting Credit Card Data that do not store prohibited data • Visa's PABP published in 2005 Provide vendors guidance to develop products that facilitate Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) compliance Minimize compromises caused by insecure payment applications with emphasis on track data storage • List of validated payment applications published monthly since January 2006 555 products across 254 vendors independently validated by a Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) List of PA-DSS validated applications published at www.pcisecuritystandards.org and www.visa.com/cisp List of vulnerable payment applications published quarterly since February 2007 PABP adopted by PCI SSC as an industry standard, PA-DSS in April 2008 FOCUS

#### Payment Application Mandates: U.S.

• Visa plans to drive the use of secure payment applications in the marketplace

Phase	Compliance Mandate	Effective Date
I.	Newly boarded merchants must not use known vulnerable payment application and VisaNet Processors (VNPs) and agents must not certify known vulnerable payment applications	1/1/08
П.	VNP and agents must certify only PA-DSS compliant payment applications to their platforms	7/1/08
Ш.	Newly boarded Level 3 and 4 merchants must be PCI DSS compliant or utilize PA-DSS compliant payment applications $^{\rm 1}$	10/1/08
IV.	VNP and agents must decertify all known vulnerable payment applications <sup>2</sup>	10/1/09
V.	Acquirers must ensure their merchants, VNP and agents use PA-DSS compliant payment applications	7/1/10

1. In-house use only developed applications & stand-alone POS terminals are not applicable

2. VisaNet Processors and agents must decertify vulnerable payment applications within 12 months of identification



